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ABSTRACT The fourth industrial revolution (Industry 4.0) is transforming the next generation of the supply
chain by making it more agile and efficient compared with the traditional supply chain. However, data
communication across the partners in the Industry 4.0 supply chain can be the target of a wide spectrum
of attackers exploiting security breaches in the internal/external environment of the partners due to its
heterogeneous and dynamic nature as well as the fact that the non-professional users in security issues usually
operate their information systems. Attackers can compromise the data communication between legitimate
parties in the Industry 4.0 Supply Chain, and thus, jeopardizing the delivery of services across the partners as
well as the continuity of the service provision. Consequently, secure data communications across the partners
in the Industry 4.0 Supply Chain are of utmost importance. Toward this direction, TLS protocol, which is the
de facto standard for secure Internet communications, is employed to ensure secure communication between
a user’s web browser and a remoteweb server located in the premises of the same or another partner. However,
over the last few years, there have been several serious attacks on TLS, including man-in-the-middle attacks
in web applications using TLS to secure HTTP communication. Therefore, in this paper, we propose an
efficient TLS-based authentication mechanism, which is resistant against MITM in web applications.
INDEX TERMS TLS, MITM attack, authentication, impersonation, HTTPS, Industry 4.0 Supply Chain.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, we have witnessed the emergence of
the fourth Industrial Revolution (Industry 4.0), where man,
machine, and product will be interconnected throughout the
whole Supply Chain from the production floor to the man-
agerial level [1]–[10]. However, the emergence of Industry
4.0 will also affect the next generation of the Supply Chain by
transforming it to a more agile and efficient compared to the
traditional Supply Chain. This will boost the productivity and
allow customized and flexible production while benefiting
from the economies of scale [11], [12]. Nevertheless, despite
the benefits that Industry 4.0 will bring in the Supply Chain,
the high degree of interconnectivity among the partners in the
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
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Industry 4.0 Supply Chain raises many security challenges
that should be addressed effectively and efficiently before the
next generation of the Supply Chain reaches its full potential
in Industry 4.0 era [1], [2], [13]–[16].
In fact, data communication across the partners in the
Industry 4.0 Supply Chain can become a soft target of many
known and unknown security threats exploiting security
breaches in the internal/external environment of the partners
due to its heterogeneous and dynamic nature as well as the
fact that employees without cybersecurity awareness usually
operate the information systems [2]. Particularly, these vul-
nerabilities in the Industry 4.0 Supply Chain can be exploited
by attackers with a wide spectrum of motivations ranging
from criminal intents aimed at financial gain to industrial
espionage and cyber-sabotage. Attackers can compromise
the data communication between legitimate parties in the
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Industry 4.0 Supply Chain and thus, can jeopardize the deliv-
ery of services across the partners as well as the continuity of
the service provision [2], [13]. As a result, Industry 4.0 Sup-
ply Chain partners will suffer from damaging repercussions,
which can cause significant revenue loss, destroy their brand,
and eventually hinder their advancement. Therefore, secure
data communications across the partners in the Industry
4.0 Supply Chain are of utmost importance [2]. Towards
this direction, TLS protocol, which is the de facto standard
for secure Internet communications, is employed to ensure
secure communication between a user’s web browser and a
remote web server located in the premises of the same or
another partner. However, over the last few years, there have
been several serious attacks on TLS including Man-In-The
Middle attacks against web applications that use the TLS
protocol to secure HTTP communication [23].
Therefore, in this paper, we propose an efficient TLS-based
authentication mechanism which is resistant against MITM
attacks in web applications that use the TLS protocol to
secure HTTP communication. Specifically, the proposed
mechanism prevents the attacker from impersonating the
legitimate server to the user (i.e., client), with the objective
of impersonating the user to the server and thus comprising
user’s sensitive information. Our TLS-based authentication
mechanism is based on the SISCA mechanism which is pro-
posed in [22] and relies on Channel ID-based authentication
and server invariance. Compared to the SISCA mechanism,
our proposed authentication mechanism reduces the commu-
nication overhead by 50 %, while its computational overhead
is almost equal to the computational overhead of the SISCA
authentication mechanism.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives an overview of the TLS protocol and the state-of-the-
art of countermeasures for TLS MITM attacks. Section III
presents the proposed TLS authentication mechanism and
Section IV provides the security analysis of the proposed
mechanism. Section V includes the analysis of the perfor-
mance evaluation of the proposed mechanism and Section VI
shows details of its implementation on a test-bed. Finally,
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this Section, we give an overview of the TLS protocol
and the state-of-the-art the countermeasures for TLS MIMT
attacks [6], [24].
A. TLS PROTOCOL
The TLS protocol is used to establish a connection between
two parties in a secure way. TLS can be considered as version
3.1 of SSL, as it is based on SSL 3.0 Protocol [25]. The
main objective of this protocol is to provide privacy and
data integrity between two communicating entities over the
Internet. TLS consists of two layers: the TLSRecord Protocol
and the TLS Handshake Protocol. The TLS Record Protocol
is at the lowest level and provides connection security that
has two basic properties: a) the connection is private and
b) the connection is reliable. To achieve the first property
(i.e., private connection), symmetric cryptography is used for
data encryption, where the keys are generated uniquely for
each connection and are based on a secret, negotiated by
the TLS Handshake Protocol. On the other hand, to achieve
the second property (i.e., reliable connection), the message
transport includes a message integrity check using a keyed
MAC [25]. On top of the TLS Record Protocol, the TLS
Handshake Protocol runs to allow the two communication
entities to authenticate each other and to negotiate a cipher
and cryptographic keys before the application protocol trans-
mits/receives its first byte of data. In particular, the TLS
Handshake Protocol provides connection security with the
following three basic properties. Firstly, the communicating
entities can authenticate each other by using asymmetric
cryptography (e.g., RSA). Secondly, the negotiation of a
shared secret is secure so that the secret will remain unavail-
able to an attacker (i.e., eavesdropper), and for any authenti-
cated connection the secret cannot be revealed to the attacker;
Finally, the negotiation is reliable so that an attacker will not
be able to modify the negotiation without being detected by
the communicating entities [25].
B. TLS MITM ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES
In MITM attack, first, the adversary positions herself in
the network path between the victim’s browser and the
server.When the victim sends a request for establishing a new
TLS connection with the server, the adversary intercepts and
responds to it using a forged certificate. If the victim accepts
this certificate, then she completes the TLS setup with the
adversary, who has, as a result, successfully masqueraded as
the server. Simultaneously, the adversary establishes a new
TLS connection with the server. At this point, the adversary
has two active TLS connections: one with the victim and
one with the server. However, from the victim’s and server’s
perspectives, there is only one secure connection in place. The
adversary can now decrypt, re-encrypt and forward all the
messages exchanged between the victim and the server. As a
result, the adversary can access private information (e.g.,
passwords) or even modify it (e.g., code injection). Most
browsers perform multiple checks to validate TLS servers
certificates and authenticate the server-side of the commu-
nication. If any of these checks fails (e.g., MITM attack),
the browser relies on security indicators (e.g., warnings mes-
sages) to notify the user. However, most of the users tend to
ignore these indicators due to the lack of training and high
false positive rates [26]–[28]. Many existing defense mech-
anism against TLS MITM attacks have been proposed and
adopted in real-world systems recently [20], [22], [29]–[34].
These mechanisms are classified into two types. The first
type focuses on enhancing the certificate authentication
model where prevents an adversary from impersonating
the server by using a valid certificate that has been mis-
issued [32]–[34]. The second type focuses on strengthening
client authentication. Strong client authentication aims to
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TABLE 1. Existing TLS MITM countermeasures.
prevent an adversary to steal the user credential information
even if she can successfully impersonate the server to the user.
In order to enhance the certificates, one approach is mul-
tiple browser-based mechanisms where browser extensions
can keep track of the certificates used by the browser and
can detect certificate changes [17]. However, the effective-
ness of this approach is affected by false positives and
lack of user training. Another approach, known as certifi-
cate pinning [18], uses a white-list of certificates for impor-
tant domains in order to reduce the incidence of MITM
attacks due to compromised certification authorities and other
authentication errors and attacks. This solution is less prone
to false positives; however, it is neither flexible nor scal-
able. Furthermore, the most popular approach is the use
of additional third-parties to extend or replace the rigid
CA trust model. In this approach, users can select one or
more third-parties to confirm the authenticity of a certifi-
cate in order to improve the chances of detecting a MITM
attack [19]. However, this approach has several shortcomings
such as significant deployment and operational costs (e.g.,
additional infrastructure with high availability requirements),
more complex trust model for users, privacy concerns and
more complex revocation procedures. Therefore, the inherent
complexity and costs associated with third-party solutions
have prevented their widespread deployment. As a result,
most users still rely on weak certificate validation checks to
detect MITM attacks.
Strong client authentication prevents user credential theft
or renders it useless, even if the attacker can successfully
impersonate the server to the user. One prominent proposal
on strong client authentication is the channel ID mechanism
which proposed by Balfanz and Hamilton in [20]. The chan-
nel ID mechanism is a TLS extension and originally was
proposed as Origin-Bound Certificates (OBCs) [21]. Channel
ID enables browsers to generate self-signed certificate to
conduct TLS client-side authentication, and further prevent
MITM attackers to impersonate as the victim’s browsers.
Google Chrome uses this mechanism and it is expected that
the channel ID to be used in the second factor authentication
standard U2F, proposed by the FIDO alliance [35]. The U2F
is designed to provide strong authentication for users on the
web while preserving the user’s privacy. The user carries a
’U2F device’ as a second factor. However, the U2F device
protocol can only detect the most situations in the MITM
attack, and not all the situations.
However, Karapanos and Capkun showed that Chan-
nel ID-based approaches are still vulnerable to TLS
MIMT attack [22]. In this regards, they have proposed the
SISCA authentication mechanism which combines Chan-
nel ID-based approach with the server invariance. Server
invariance is based on sender invariance which was formally
defined in [36]. The summary of related work is described
in Table 1.
III. THE PROPOSED TLS-BASED AUTHENTICATION
MECHANISM
A. ADVERSARY MODEL AND GOALS
The TLS protocol enables users to access their online
accounts securely. Moreover, the user authentication creden-
tial information is protected by TLS. However, it is necessary
to verify the server’s authenticity during the TLS connection
establishment. If the adversary impersonates the legitimate
server to the user (i.e., client), then it can impersonate the user
to the legitimate server in order to steal the user’s credential
information and use them for further malicious activities
(e.g., compromise communication, transactions). This attack
is known as TLSMan-In-The-Middle (MITM) [22], [23] (see
Figure 1).
B. THE PROPOSED MECHANISM
We assume that prior to the mechanism execution, the TLS
protocol is established between the client (Partner A) and
the server (Partner B) in Industry 4.0 Supply Chain. Then,
the server generates one key Ks which is used for all mech-
anism executions (i.e., not for a specific client) and is never
disclosed to other parties. It is important to note that the mes-
sages are exchanged within the first HTTP request/response
pair. Moreover, we have considered that the server and client
deploy Channel ID-based authentication. Thus, each TLS
connection will therefore have a channel ID Cidb that is
created by the user’s browser and is also known by the
server. The proposed mechanism consists of two phases:
• Initialization:
The purpose of this phase is to make a preparation for
the client authentication. In our proposed mechanism,
once the browser establishes a TLS connection (for the
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FIGURE 1. The man-in-the-middle attack scenario in Industry 4.0 Supply Chain.
FIGURE 2. The proposed TLS-based authentication mechanism.
first time in a browsing session), the initialization phase
occurs. First, the browser uses a pseudorandom number
generator (PRNG) to generate randomly the number rb
and the key Kb. Then, the browser calculates the secret
value of tb as follows:
tb = H (rb,Kb,Cidb) (1)
where Cidb is the browser’s channel ID and H (.) is a
collision resistance hash function (i.e., SHA-1). After-
wards, the browser sends tb within the first HTTP
request to the server (step 1), as it is shown in Figure 2.
The server calculates two security parameters t ′b and ts
based on the following equations:
t ′b = H (rs,Cidb, tb,Ks) (2)
ts = H (t ′b, rs,Cidb,Ks) (3)
These parameters are used on the server side in order to
check the originality of tb and t ′b, respectively. Ks and
rs are the server’s key and a random number which
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FIGURE 3. Impersonate the initialization phase.
is selected randomly by the server, respectively. Next,
the server sends back ts and t ′b within its first HTTP
response to the browser (step 2). Finally, the browser
stores ts and t ′b for further communication.
• Verification:
The verification phase takes place upon every subse-
quent TLS connection to the server (Partner B), which
occurs within the same browsing session. The browser
first sends tb and t ′b to the server (step 3). Then, the server
checks if:
t ′b = H (rs,Cidb, tb,Ks) (4)
If the check passes, the server calculates t ′s as follows:
t ′s = H (t ′b, rs,Cidb,Ks) (5)
Then, t ′s is sent to the browser (step 4), as it is shown
in Figure 2. If ts (i.e., stored value at the initialization
phase) and t ′s are equal on the browser side, then the
browser considers that the response arrives from a legit-
imate server; otherwise, the browser aborts the session.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we have provided the security analysis of
the proposed mechanism. The security analysis includes two
possible attack scenarios. In Figure 3, we illustrate the first
attack scenario where the adversary intercepts the initial-
ization phase. In this regard, the adversary needs to inform
the browser that has reached the legitimate server. However,
the adversary does not have the Ks and Cidb, because the
Ks and Cidb are securely stored in the server and browser,
respectively. Therefore, the adversary will calculate and send
to the browser incorrect values of t ′b (i.e., t ′a) and ts. Thus,
the legitimate server recognizes these incorrect values in the
verification phase and does not process the request.
FIGURE 4. Impersonate the verification phase.
The second attack scenario is shown in Figure 4 where
the adversary intercepts during the verification phase. In this
scenario, however, the adversary receives the tb and t ′b from
the browser, but the adversary does not know the correct value
of Ks and Cidb. Therefore, the adversary calculates and sends
to the browser an incorrect value of t ′s which is not equal to
the value of ts that was calculated by the server and stored by
the browser in the initialization phase and thus, the browser
recognizes these incorrect values in the verification phase and
rejects the response.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we compare our proposedmechanismwith the
SISCA mechanism in terms of communication overhead and
computational overhead.
A. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
In order to analyze the communication overhead, we assume
the overhead of TLS request made by the browser and the
TLS response made by the server are negligible. Table 2
is the setting of parameters, based on [37], for calculating
the communication overhead of the SISCA authentication
mechanism and our proposed authentication mechanism.
TABLE 2. Setting of parameters [37].





| Messagei |= 768 bits, (6)
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TABLE 3. Number of operations required during the initialization and verification phases.
TABLE 4. Time required by initialization and verification phases.
where
• Message1 =| rb |= 128 bits
• Message2 =| rs | + | t1 | + | t2 |= 256 bits
• Message3 =| rb | + | rs | + | t1 |= 320 bits
• Message4 =| t ′2 |= 64 bits
However, the communication overhead of our proposed




| Messagei |= 384 bits, (7)
where
• Message1 =| tb |= 64 bits
• Message2 =| ts | + | t ′b |= 128 bits
• Message3 =| tb | + | t ′b |= 128 bits
• Message4 =| t ′s |= 64 bits
According to the above calculation, our proposed authen-
tication mechanism reduces the communication overhead by
50 % compared to the SISCA authentication mechanism.
B. COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEAD
Our proposed authentication mechanism includes the same
type of operations (i.e., random generation, key genera-
tion, and collision-resistance hash function/MAC) as the
SISCA authentication mechanism. Table 3 shows the number
of operations required by the browser and the server dur-
ing the initialization and verification phases of the SISCA
authentication mechanism and our proposed authentication
mechanism.
We assume that TH is the computational time required for
a collision-resistant hash function, Tr is the time required
to generate a random number, and Tk is the time required
to generate a random key. Table 4 shows the computational
times required by the web browser and server to perform
the initialization and verification phases in the SISCA mech-
anism and our proposed mechanism. As we can see from
Table 4, the time required by the web browser and the server
to perform the initialization and verification in the SISCA
mechanism is approximately 4TH + 2Tr + 2Tk , while it is
approximately 5TH+2Tr+2Tk for our proposed mechanism.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
The demonstrator is an implementation on a JBoss AS
5.1 server and is optimized for the Microsoft Edge
and Google Chrome browsers. The server address is
https://id4185:8443/Retailer1 and when the user enters the
address into the web browser for the first time, it opens the
initialization page. In the initialization page, we can con-
sider three possible scenarios: a) communication between a
legitimate browser and a reliable server without considering
any MITM attacker, b) communication between a legitimate
browser and a reliable server where a MITM attacker is
considered between the browser and server during the ini-
tialization phase, and c) communication between a legitimate
browser and a reliable server where a MITM attacker is
considered between the browser and server during the veri-
fication phase.
A. SCENARIO A
In the first scenario, the browser has already been registered
during the initialization phase and thus it is recognized by
the server. As it shown in Figure 5 the browser sends the
parameter tb = 906A46D01100483DA3F2432A537895A92
A8A575 5 and t ′b = B02170FBD00C993FE114CA41E37DF
69EA8CE 89F0 to the server, as these parameters are cal-
culated in the initialization phase. Afterwards, the server
responses back to the browser by sending the parameter
ts = 281CB53474E4A7158E78E22E7A44EC9942F7DDEE
as it is shown in Figure 6. Then, the browser receives the
response and checks if the received parameter t ′s is equal to
ts. If t ′s is equal to ts, then the browser starts communicating
with the server.
B. SCENARIO B
In the second scenario, during the transmission of message 3,
as it is shown in Figure 4, the server receives an invalid value
of t ′b (e.g., t ′b=196EAA46D4D8D5EE1C149B05A2D915C1
88205C3D, as it is shown in Figure 7). Since this value is
calculated and sent by the attacker, the server detects an error
and aborts the session.
C. SCENARIO C
In the third scenario, during the transmission of message 4,
as it is shown in Figure 5, the browser receives an invalid
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FIGURE 5. The messages exchanged during the initialization phase of our proposed mechanism.
FIGURE 6. Browser’s request is accepted.
FIGURE 7. Communication between a legitimate browser and a reliable server where a MITM attacker is considered between
the browser and server during the initialization phase.
FIGURE 8. Communication between a legitimate browser and a reliable server where a MITM attacker is considered between
the browser and server during the verification phase.
value of t ′s (e.g., t ′s = 1E916722C7EB54A08706F023674CF
57F63A7335D, as it is shown in Figure 8). As this value
is already calculated and sent by the attacker, the browser
detects an error and aborts the session.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an efficient TLS-based
authentication mechanism for web applications that use the
TLS protocol to secure HTTP communication. Our proposed
authentication mechanism prevents the attacker from imper-
sonating the legitimate server to the user (i.e., client), with
the objective of impersonating the user to the server and
thus comprising user’s sensitive information. Our TLS-based
authentication mechanism is based on the SISCAmechanism
which is proposed in [22] and relies on Channel ID-based
authentication and server invariance. Thus, we achieve
browser’s and server’s identity confidentiality and resistance
against MITM attacks. Compared to the SISCA mechanism,
our proposed authentication mechanism reduces the commu-
nication overhead by 50 %, while its computational overhead
is almost equal to the computational overhead of the SISCA
authentication mechanism. As future work, we plan to imple-
ment our proposed mechanism between a client (Partner A)
and a server (Partner B) running on two different machines
(i.e., two laptops) interconnected over Internet. In addition,
we aim to adopt the proposed authentication mechanism
to provide lightweight authentication along with resistance
against MITM attacks in communications in Industrial IoT
networks.
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